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Abstract Given the high levels of uncertainty and complexity of issues considered
at the EU level, knowledge from sound and reliable sources of expertise is of a parti-
cular importance. To date, literature on the role of scientific knowledge and scientists in
EU policy-making is relatively scarce. Furthermore, we know little about the scientists
involved in EU policy-making: what attitudes do they hold regarding their contribution
to policies shaped and adapted at the EU level? How do scientists perceive their role in
EU policy-making? The article relies on new data from a survey of scientific members
of the Commission’s expert committees to gain insights into the perceptions held by
scientists on how their knowledge is used: the literature on knowledge utilisation
suggests that an agent can use knowledge as an instrument to increase its problem-solving
capacity (instrumental knowledge utilisation), but also for more strategic purposes
such as support for predetermined policy preferences (substantiating knowledge utilisa-
tion), or as a way of promoting power and influence (legitimising knowledge utilisation).
The study finds that strategic uses of knowledge are not highly prominent in the process of
proposal drafting. On the contrary, we find that the instrumental mode is perceived as
dominant by scientific contributors. Future research need to show whether this mode of
scientific knowledge utilisation is also relevant for other stages in the EU policy-making
process.
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Introduction
Scientific expertise is increasingly becoming a critical element in the design,
implementation and assessment of public policies. This means that policy-
makers must be able to consult the scientific community. Scientists should
have an opportunity to share their concerns and knowledge. This will ensure
that decisions are objective and based on sound scientific evidence. (European
Commission, 2005, p. 1)
In recent decades, attention has been placed not only on the quality of EU legislation,
but also on the policy-making process within which legislation is developed
(Radaelli, 1999a; Richardson, 2006). The European Commission (hereafter, ‘the
Commission’) argues that policies have become increasingly complex, leading to the
EU facing growing uncertainty in fields such as social matters, human and animal
health, food safety, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), monetary union, and
macroeconomics (European Commission, 2001, p. 19; Tosun, 2013). With the high
levels of uncertainty and complexity of issues considered at the EU level, knowledge
based on sound and reliable expertise is of a particular importance. Haas notes that
‘[…] the uncertainties associated with many modern responsibilities of international
governance turn to new and different channels of advice, often with the result that
international policy coordination is advanced’ (1992, p. 12). Given such circumstances,
policy-makers are influenced by new information and after consulting scientific
communities they are able to determine policy alternatives (Weiss, 1979; Haas, 1992).
Despite the normative explanations emphasising the crucial role of (scientific)
expertise in policy-making, we know little about the actual role of science and
scientists involved: what attitudes do they hold regarding their contribution to
policies shaped and adapted at the EU level? How do scientists perceive their role
in EU policy-making? In this contribution, we analyse the perceptions of scientists
regarding the extent to which the Commission uses scientific evidence, or more
precisely, whether the Commission uses this knowledge in the way it is meant to be
used, namely as an instrument to broaden the understanding of existing problems and
to shape solutions to them. Or, on the contrary, is expertise used as a tool to advance
the Commission’s policy preferences or institutional powers and influence.
In this article, we seek to go beyond the existing research by systematically
tapping into the use of scientific expertise across specific policy areas and
Directorates General (DG) of the Commission. We report the results of a survey of
more than a 100 scientists who have assisted the Commission in the preparation of
legislative proposals as members of expert committees. The article draws on these
new data to gain insights into the perceptions on three conceptual modes of
knowledge utilisation: instrumental, substantiating and legitimising.
The recent literature on knowledge utilisation distinguishes several rationales
behind EU policy-making and the use of scientific knowledge (Boswell, 2008;
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Schrefler, 2010). Knowledge can be used instrumentally, meaning that scientific
expertise serves as a way of vocalising the cause-and-effect of complex issues, and
providing information that helps to frame a problem, fostering a collective debate and
search for scientifically based solutions to existing problems (Haas, 1992, p. 2). Here,
policy outcomes, for example policy initiatives, reflect results in which scientific
arguments are highly influential to the consideration of policy alternatives. Scientists
are consulted because policy-makers seek to advance their understanding, reduce
uncertainty and approach existing problems with sound evidence at hand. Scientific
expertise also can be used strategically. The strategic use of expertise in the literature
is divided in two subcategories: (1) substantiating, that is the agent, in this case the
Commission, seeks to promote or/and justify its predetermined policy preferences,
and (2) legitimising, that is the motivation behind this mode of knowledge use is
related to one’s goals to increase political influence and powers as such and/or to
strengthen prestige, status or reputation (Schrefler, 2010, p. 315).
The focus of this study is on scientists providing contributions that are taken up by
Commission officials. We focus on scientists for two reasons. First, we assume that
scientists functioning as external actors providing knowledge to policy-makers are
more likely to provide honest information. Haas (1992) notes that the motives and
behaviour of scientific communities are different from those who have to function
under the bureaucratic constraints, that is Commission officials. Scientific commu-
nities share ‘cause-and-effect’ understanding, principled beliefs and a consensual
knowledge base (Haas, 1992, p. 18). In contrast, the Commission official’s mandate
is to use scientific evidence in an instrumental way, which makes it more likely that
strategic uses would be underreported. Second, given the dearth of case-transcending
systematic empirical data mapping, scientists’ perceptions are an important contribu-
tion to advancing the understanding of the role of knowledge in the EU policy-
making process (see also the section ‘Operationalising modes of knowledge
utilisation’).
Scientists are considered to be those who have a ‘sufficiently strong claim to a
body of knowledge that is valued by society’ (Haas, 1992, p. 16). They use methods
that are conventional to their discipline. Other actors, such as interest groups, can also
provide expertise; however, their knowledge is considered to be non-scientific for the
sake of this study. More particularly, we focus on so-called in-sourced experts rather
than scientists directly employed by the Commission (Van Schendelen, 2003).
As we focus on Commission expert groups, we deal with the early stage of policy-
making, where the Commission initiates and formulates policy proposals. This
approach sheds light on the interaction patterns between the Commission and
scientific communities and makes it possible to capture the underlying knowledge
utilisation practices, because at this policy-making stage scientists actively partici-
pate in policy formulation and can directly observe the use of their knowledge.
To be sure, Commission proposals need to be accepted by the Council and
typically also by the European Parliament and therefore proposals are often modified
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in the course of legislative bargaining. At the same time, the Commission has room to
manoeuvre in the agenda-setting stage. The Commission is in charge of organising
not only the input from expert committees, but also the input from Member States’
officials and other stakeholders. The Commission can choose a range of issues it
wants to bring onto the EU agenda and how issues are framed. It can offer policy
alternatives consistent with particular frames while neglecting others (Radaelli, 1995;
see also Majone, 1997; Princen, 2009).
In the remainder of the article we first theorise the use of expertise in policy-
making. On the basis of a brief review of the literature on knowledge utilisation in the
European Union, we then conceptualise the modes of knowledge utilisation and
translate these into statements amenable for large-N research. We then introduce our
survey design, followed by the analysis and discussion of the survey results and the
conclusion.
Theoretical Framework: Commission Use of Knowledge Neutral or
Strategic?
There are a number of reasons why we can expect the Commission to use scientific
knowledge as an instrument to tackle policy issues. In rational choice theory,
explanations of institutional choices focus on the functions a certain institution has
to perform and its influence on policy outcomes (Pollack, 1997). To explain the
delegation of tasks to non-majoritarian institutions, a functionalist approach empha-
sises expertise that is produced by independent bodies that are separated from their
creators. This delegation is justified by the need for collective actions and the
necessity to resolve commitment problems, as well as the requirement to overcome
information asymmetries in order to produce well-informed, long-term oriented
policies at the EU level (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 4). Following the
functional theory of delegation, the legislators, that is the Council and the European
Parliament, confer tasks to the Commission precisely because it is expected that the
Commission acts in a neutral manner, that is, its behaviour is based on sound
evidence rather than on competing preferences, ideologies or interests (Majone,
1996; Tallberg, 2002; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 4). Member States prefer
the Commission to have the agenda-setting authority because they expect ‘relatively
unbiased and well-informed proposals […]’ (Pollack, 1997, p. 106). With the
delegation of policy-making tasks to the supranational agent, that is the Commission,
collective choices are expected to be based on reliable evidence.
The institutional structure of the EU follows this logic. In its role as an agenda-
setter, the Commission can rely on more than a thousand expert committees that
assist in initiating and formulating new legislation (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011).
As the Commission is arguably under-resourced and understaffed for the tasks at
hand, the practical work of proposal drafting is in most cases inconceivable without
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the external provision of expertise from various types of sources (Van Schendelen,
2003, p. 1; Morten, 2007, p. 150; Princen, 2011, p. 936; Haverland and Liefferink,
2012). Expert committees ‘are the largest organized information system in the
EU’ (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011, p. 50) outnumbering the two other major venues
for expert advice, namely the Council Working Groups, the work horse of the
Council and the Comitology Committees, where national civil servants scrutinise the
Commission when it comes to delegated legislation and the implementation of
policies (Eichener, 1997; Joerges and Vos, 1999; Quaglia et al, 2008; Gornitzka and
Sverdrup, 2011). In short, the use of expertise has become a sine qua non for the
Commission. Almost all policies that emanate from the EU are based on proposals
made by the Commission.
Furthermore, the fact that the European Union and therewith the Commission
deals with issues of regulation rather than issues of redistribution contributes to the
Commission’s autonomy. Regulatory issues are often characterised by high levels of
complexity and uncertainty. Given the characteristics of the issues, mass public
mobilisation is rather unlikely (Cobb and Elder, 1975: referred to in Cobb et al, 1976,
p. 130). This opens up the opportunity for developing policy agenda relatively
undisturbed inside the political system, rather than as a response to external pressures
(Cobb et al, 1976; see also Radaelli, 1995, pp. 168–170). This argument is well
summarised by Radaelli:
Knowledge, rather than budget, is the critical resource in [regulatory, EU]
policy-making, and the Commission utilizes this resource extensively. Regula-
tory policies aim at efficiency, rather than redistribution. This makes them
suitable for discussion and negotiation in expert circles, whereas redistribution
kindles the passions of politicians, political parties and mass opinion because
of its impact on the class structure. (1999b, p. 759)
However, theories of delegation also emphasise that the agents who are assigned
certain tasks might have different preferences from the principals who have delegated
these tasks. The underlying assumption in the P-A models is that agents develop
their own interests over time and they are in a position to promote these because they
have the resources, that is expertise and, in particular, scientific expertise, which are
crucial for modern policy-making (Majone, 1997). Hence, even though the Commis-
sion has the task and the means to use scientific evidence in a neutral way, it may
actually use the scientific committees it manages and the evidence generated there
strategically to advance its policy positions or institutional ambitions (Majone, 1996;
Boswell, 2008; Schrefler, 2010).
Although the delegation literature, as well as the general literature on public
policy-making, gives rise to the expectation that the Commission uses scientific
evidence in a strategic manner, we have no systematic evidence about the extent
to which this is actually the case. The need to identify broader patterns is highly
advocated in recent work mapping the directions of the future research agenda on
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this topic (Tosun, 2013, p. 1522). The literature on the role of expertise in EU
policy-making is rich in conceptualisation but empirical research is restricted to
either general information about the composition of expert groups or a few in-depth
case studies tracing the use of knowledge in specific settings. However, even if
scientists are indeed members of expert groups, it is not clear whether and how their
input is actually used. Furthermore, even though in-depth case studies are ideally
suited to trace processes of knowledge utilisation, they cannot show whether their
findings are confined to their cases or hold more generally (see Haverland, 2007).
Research on the Role of Knowledge in (EU) Policy-making
There is a rich literature on the role of (scientific) knowledge in public policy-making
in general and there also are studies on EU policy-making in particular (for example,
Weiss, 1979, 1986, 1999; Barnes and Edge, 1982; Wittrock, 1991; Radaelli, 1995,
1999b, 2009; Herbst, 2003; Amara et al, 2004; Hertin et al, 2007; Boswell, 2008,
2009a; Brown, 2009; Haverland, 2009; Schrefler, 2010). This literature has advanced
our knowledge in three ways. First, it conceptualises the use of scientific knowledge,
moving beyond the simple dichotomy of the use and non-use of knowledge.
The main pioneer in this respect was Carol H. Weiss (1979). On the basis of the
existing literature on knowledge utilisation, she identified seven meanings (‘images’/
‘models’) of the use of scientific knowledge. Building on this work other authors
have arrived at more parsimonious conceptualisations. Radaelli (2009) and Schrefler
(2010) distinguish between an instrumental use, a symbolic use, a strategic political
use, a strategic substantiating use and the non-use of scientific knowledge. Boswell
(2008) arrives at an even more parsimonious typology distinguishing an instrumental
use, a substantiating use and a legitimising one.
The second contribution lies in tracing the use of scientific knowledge in parti-
cular settings. Schrefler (2010) illustrates the four modes of scientific knowledge
utilisation in a case study of US regulatory agencies. Boswell has analysed the use of
expert knowledge by the European Commission generated through the European
Migration Network (Boswell, 2008). Haverland has traced how the Dutch govern-
ment has used (scientific) experts to influence EU chemicals policy (Haverland,
2009). Delfani contributes to the analysis of the role of policy bureaucrats who
interact with experts by focusing on policy learning processes in the labour market
policies of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden (Delfani, 2013).
Other studies focus on the institutional elements of knowledge utilisation.
Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2011) have collected and analysed data on the composition
of the 1237 Commission expert groups that existed at the beginning of 2007. Egeberg
et al (2003) have surveyed 218 national officials from 14 Member States attending
Commission expert groups and/or Council Working Group and/or Comitology
Committees. This research was aimed at arriving at general features of the inner
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workings of these committees but has not been particularly tailored towards the use
of scientific knowledge.
Our research adds to each of the three advancements. First, we built on existing
typologies of the use of scientific knowledge and operationalise these concepts into
survey questions, hence making the topic amenable to large-N research. Second, we
complement the case studies. Often cases are selected to illustrate how one particular
mode of knowledge utilisation prevails against the others. As a result, case studies
cannot provide us with a comprehensive picture of the use of knowledge in policy-
making. And third, we built on large-N research of general features of the institu-
tional venues for the provision of expertise to shed light on whether the presence of
scientists in these committees translates into scientific considerations when discuss-
ing policy problems and shaping proposals to solve them.
Operationalising Modes of Knowledge Utilisation
Modes of knowledge utilisation have been conceptualised with case studies in mind.
As our article uses a survey, we are confronted with challenge to ‘quantify’ the use of
knowledge. We have taken the existing typologies as a heuristic device to arrive at
our survey questions (Weiss, 1979; Radaelli, 1999b, 2009; Boswell, 2008; Schrefler,
2010). We follow the lead of Boswell and differentiate between an instrumental
mode, a substantiating mode and a legitimising mode, enriching these on the basis of
other literature. We also experimented with the more nuanced typologies of Radaelli
(2009) and Schrefler (2010), but we felt that there is a thin line between what they
call the ‘symbolic mode’ and the ‘strategic political mode’. This has raised issues
regarding conceptual independence and led to difficulties in identifying a clear-cut
operationalisation of these concepts.
The instrumental mode
The first mode of knowledge utilisation represents the way scientific knowledge
is normatively meant to be used: as an instrument to solve policy problems and/or
increase the problem-solving capacity. Boswell (2008) and Schrefler (2010) label
this mode ‘instrumental’ (see also Weiss, 1979; Radaelli, 2009). The motivation
for instrumental knowledge utilisation might be found in the responsibilities of an
actor to perform their mandate and obligations to convey outputs and specific
tasks, which are set up by the political principals (Schrefler, 2010). This reasoning is
rooted in the functionalist theories of delegation. Hence, the underlying principle
of the instrumental use of knowledge is a type of policy-making in which the
‘rational’ aspect of the policy process is stressed (Caplan, 1979; Weiss, 1979;
Radaelli, 2009).
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Weiss elaborates: ‘A problem exists and a decision has to be made, information or
understanding is lacking either to generate a solution to the problem or to select
among alternative solutions, research provides the missing knowledge. With the gap
filled, a decision is reached’ (1979, p. 427; see also Boswell, 2008, p. 474). In this
case, expert knowledge constitutes the main source of arguments used to choose
between policy options. Hertin et al note that knowledge is used instrumentally ‘[…]
for concrete decisions in the sense of specific information to improve the design of
policies and provide rational guidance’ (2007, p. 6). The assumption in this reasoning
is that if policy issues are identified and clearly defined, policy-makers use the best
available information and analysis of what seems to work to come up with decision
options and choose the most efficient solution for the problem at stake.
The following statements in the questionnaire of this study have been used to
reflect this mode of knowledge utilisation:
● Scientific knowledge was used to broaden the understanding of existing issues.
● Scientific knowledge was transferred into the legislative proposal.
● Scientific knowledge was used to solve existing problems.
● Scientific knowledge was relevant for the formulation of legislative proposal.
Unlike the problem-solving approach, which is based on well-weighted and
evidence-based considerations, policy outputs/outcomes reflecting strategic knowledge
utilisation are rooted in the self-interests of key actors. The strategic use of expertise in
the literature is divided in two subcategories: substantiating and legitimising.
The substantiating mode
Knowledge might be used to substantiate choices, which are predetermined before a
consultation with scientific experts (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Expertise is
employed to support policy choices, which have already been taken (Amara et al,
2004; see also Haas, 2004, p. 574; Boswell, 2008; Schrefler, 2010). Policy-makers
use new research only if it fits this position, or only those parts of research that do.
Knowledge that coincides with policy-makers’ position and preferences based on
political or economic interests is employed to take decisions or to gain superiority
over alternative positions (Hertin et al, 2007). Sometimes research is taken out of the
context to make an impression of approval of the predetermined position (Weiss,
1979) or evidence is even consciously manipulated (Hertin et al, 2007, p. 20).
According to Boswell (2009a), the substantiating use of knowledge enables the agent
to gain support and approval for the choices they make when taking important
decisions. In order to tap this mode of knowledge utilisation, the following
statements were put to the respondents:
● Scientific knowledge was used to justify the preferred and predetermined policy
choices of the DG in charge of the legislative proposal.
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● I have noticed that the DG had its own position and searched for the scientific
arguments in favour of its position.
● Other experts’ advice was prioritised against mine mainly because their position
was closer to the DG’s position.
● The Commission had a clear vision on what the new policy/legislation should look
like and the presence of scientists did not change this vision.
The legitimising mode
Knowledge can also be used to enhance one’s position in the policy arena and to gain
legitimacy and prestige in respect to other actors or institutions rather than to find
a solution to a specific problem. Boswell calls this mode the ‘legitimising mode’
(Boswell, 2008) and Schrefler refers to the ‘political’ mode (Schrefler, 2010, p. 315). In
this case, the agency just seeks to convince others (for example in our context, other DG
of the Commission, the Council or the European Parliament) that it has competence and
capacities to make highly specialised decisions (Radaelli, 1999b). It is also used to meet
accountability demands in EU policy-making (cf. Majone, 1996; Boswell, 2008). The
fact that knowledge is produced and maintained by the agency is more important than
the actual use of the knowledge (Weiss, 1979). Scientific research findings and/or
databases provide actors with ‘epistemic authority’ (Herbst, 2003, p. 484; see also
Boswell, 2008). The DG might feel the need for such ‘epistemic authority’, because the
Commission is a multi-lateral organisation in which they are involved in inter-
departmental battles and tensions (Hix, 2005). Scientific expertise might also be used
to cope with external pressure generated by legislative bargaining processes, where the
Commission has to manoeuvre between the positions of the Council and the European
Parliament. The following survey statements reflected this:
● Scientific knowledge was used to legitimise the decisions by proving the com-
petences of the DG to the other European institutions (other DGs, the Council or
the European Parliament).
● Scientific knowledge was used to enhance prestige and reputation of the DG,
rather than to create the legislative proposal.
● The presence of scientists and their scientific knowledge was used as a tool to
increase DG’s powers and influence against other actors (other DGs, the Council
or the European Parliament).
● I have noticed that scientific knowledge was used to respond to external pressure
rather than to prepare the legislative proposal.
Given that both the substantiating and the legitimising mode constitute strategic
uses of knowledge, it is important to emphasise the essential difference in the
rationale for these two modes (Boswell, 2009b; Schrefler, 2010). The substantiating
mode of knowledge is related to the content of policy solution, while the legitimising
Rimkutė and Haverland
438 © 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics Vol. 13, 4, 430–449
mode is de-coupled from the content and merely serves as a tool to enhance an
agent’s institutional position, for example. its powers, its authority or the status of
certain organisational structures. The literature on knowledge utilisation addresses
this difference: ‘In the case of legitimizing knowledge, an administrative agency is
attempting to secure its legitimacy qua organisation. It is keen to demonstrate its
capacity to mobilise resources to produce and apply knowledge. In the case of
substantiating knowledge, by contrast, the aim is to garner support for a preferred
course of action’ (Boswell, 2009b, p. 73).
Informed by a threefold typology of modes of scientific knowledge utilisation, we
have arrived at 12 statements that can be used in a large-N study.
Research Design and Method of Data Collection
An internet-based questionnaire was used to conduct the survey. We define scientific
experts as scientists that work at academic institutions and possess an academic title
(starting with PhD candidates onwards). Information about experts was retrieved
from the Commission’s register of expert groups and similar entities.1 Note that
the database is under reconstruction and therefore does not include all expert groups.
The questionnaire was sent to 423 scientists who have provided their scientific
knowledge in various policy areas. Data were collected from 15 April 2011 until
7 June 2011. During this period, three e-mails were sent out asking (reminding) the
recipients to return the questionnaire. One hundred and twenty responses were
received (response rate: 28.4 per cent). The lion’s share of the survey is made up of
the statements that tap into the three modes of knowledge utilisation discussed in the
previous section. Scientists were asked to express their agreement or disagreement
with the statements on a seven-point scale.
In order to check for the possibility of a self-selection bias, we compared the
characteristics of the entire sample with the characteristics of the received responses
to check the extent to which the respondents are representative in terms of gender,
academic status (PhD candidates, doctors or scientists with unspecified qualifica-
tions2), responsible DG and the country in which they are based (see Table 1). The
analysis shows that the responses largely reflect the distribution in the total sample.
When it comes to the distribution across DGs, there is a slight underrepresentation of
DG Research and Innovation.
Survey Results and Discussion
How does the European Commission use scientific knowledge? Is it used as an
instrument to solve policy problems? Is it used to gain legitimacy and prestige vis-à-
vis other actors or is it used to substantiate pre-determined choices?
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The patterns of scientific expertise utilisation
What stands out is that the vast majority of respondents agreed with statements
measuring instrumental knowledge utilisation (see Table 2). Virtually all respondents
agreed that ‘scientific knowledge was used to broaden the understanding of existing
issues’ (Q1, 97 per cent).3 Nearly 90 per cent agreed that it was ‘used to solve exist-
ing problems’ (Q8, 87 per cent). When it comes to the question whether knowledge
actually feeds into legislative proposals, again nine out of 10 indicated that ‘know-
ledge was relevant for the formulation of the legislative proposal’ (Q10, 90 per cent).
Table 1: Distribution of socio-demographic attributes in the sample and responses (per cent)
Total sample Responses
Location
Old Member State 70.2 66.7
New Member State 18.4 23.3













Agriculture and Rural Development 8.5 11.7
Competition 0.7 0.8
Economic and Financial Affairs 3.5 2.5
Education and Culture 5.7 3.3
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 28.8 30.0
Enterprise and Industry 0.9 0.8
Environment 1.4 0.8
Health and Consumers 6.6 8.3
Information Society and Media 0.2 0.8
Internal Market and Services 0.7 0.8
Justice 8.0 10.8
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 19.4 18.3
Research and Innovation 15.4 10.8
Total 100.0 100.0
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More than 80 per cent also agreed with the more far reaching statement that
‘scientific knowledge was transferred into the legislative proposal’ (Q6, 82 per cent).
In sum, at least four out of five scientists agreed with any of the four statements
tapping into the instrumental use of knowledge. Disagreement with any of these
statements never exceeded 8 per cent. That is to say, scientists perceive themselves as
key actors not only in indicating boundaries and delimiting policy options, but also in
greatly influencing the actual options of policy-makers. This indicates a high
potential for ‘rational’ EU policy-making at this early drafting stage.









Q1. Scientific knowledge was used to broaden the understanding
of existing issues:
97 0 3
Q6. Scientific knowledge was transferred into the legislative
proposal:
82 10 8
Q8. Scientific knowledge was used to solve existing problems: 87 7 3




Q2. Scientific knowledge was used to justify the preferred and
predetermined policy choices of the DG in charge of the
legislative proposal:
70 14 16
Q4. I have noticed that the DG had its own position and searched
for the scientific arguments in favour of its position:
44 27 29
Q7. Other experts’ advice was prioritised against mine mainly
because their position was closer to the DG’s position:
18 27 55
Q11. The Commission had a clear vision on what the new policy/




Q3. Scientific knowledge was used to legitimise the decisions by
proving the competences of the DG to the other European
institutions (other DGs, the Council or the European Parliament):
65 19 16
Q5. Scientific knowledge was used to enhance prestige and
reputation of the DG, rather than to create the legislative proposal:
18 19 62
Q9. The presence of scientists and their scientific knowledge was
used as a tool to increase DG’s powers and influence against other
actors (other DGs, the Council or the European Parliament):
42 34 24
Q12. I have noticed that scientific knowledge was used to respond
to external pressure rather than to prepare the legislative proposal:
17 28 55
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What about the strategic uses of scientific knowledge? We find empirical support
for the ideas that scientific knowledge is also used to substantiate predetermined
choices. More than two-thirds of respondents agreed with the statement that
‘scientific knowledge was used to justify preferred and predetermined choices of the
DG in charge of the legislative proposal’ (Q2, 70 per cent). However, there was much
less agreement with the statements about more specific aspects: Q4, Q7 and Q11.
When asked whether scientists have ‘noticed that the DG had its own position and
searched for the scientific arguments in favour of its position’, fewer than half agreed
(Q4, 44 per cent). Only a third agreed that ‘the Commission had a clear vision on
what the new policy should look like and the presence of scientists did not change
this vision’, and more than half disagreed (Q11, 35 per cent versus 54 per cent). This
indicates that under certain circumstances, the role of scientific advice can be crucial
even if policy-makers have predetermined policy alternatives in mind before
consulting scientists. Under certain circumstances, policy-makers can be open to the
best solution, rather than wishing to uphold their own positions. Again, it is important
to note that even if experts are invited with a strategic substantiating agenda in mind,
they can be successful in imposing new policy alternatives and options, which are
different than those initially intended by policy-makers. The survey results clearly
illustrate that scientific experts felt they were able to play a key role in transmitting
new patterns of reasoning to policy-makers and directing them to new options that
had not been envisioned. Also less than a fifth of respondents agreed that ‘other
experts’ advice was prioritised against mine, mainly because their position was closer
to the DG’s position’ (Q7, 18 per cent). Here, we observe that the scientists involved
in the policy-making process perceive only minor patterns of selective use or, in other
words, manipulation and abuse of scientific expertise.
The same applies to the legitimising mode of knowledge utilisation. Most
scientists agreed with the general statement associated with a legitimising mode
of knowledge utilisation (Q3, 65 per cent), but only a minority with the more specific
statements. However, when asked to weight the relative importance of the legitimis-
ing mode vis-à-vis the instrumental mode, a majority of respondents suggested
that the instrumental mode was more prominent. When given the following state-
ment, that is Q5, ‘Scientific knowledge was used to enhance prestige and repu-
tation of the DG, rather than [authors’ emphasis] to create the legislative proposal’,
almost two-thirds disagreed and only 18 per cent agreed. The same tendency can
be noted with Q12, which also required the respondent to choose which aspect
of scientific knowledge utilisation was more relevant, that is instrumental or
strategic.
Overall the results point towards the perceived dominance of the instrumental use
of knowledge: the four statements capturing the instrumental use of knowledge
consistently show very high levels of agreement and when pressed to choose between
statements pointing towards a more strategic use of knowledge and an instru-
mental use, the latter statement receives much more support. At the same time, most
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scientists agreed that there are some strategic features involved as well. The two
statements (Q4, Q9) received some support. Hence, for many scientists the
instrumental use is dominant but it comes along with some strategic elements.
This should be good news for a functional perspective on delegation that scientific
knowledge is indeed used to understand policy problems and that scientific know-
ledge does translate into legislative proposal. An important rationale for the
delegation of tasks to ‘agents’ is the idea that the actors act neutrally and draw on
unbiased policy expertise. This is also the official reason why many of expert
committees are created and maintained and why scientific experts are outsourced.
Overall, our evidence suggests that this system works as intended.
This dominance of instrumental use is, however, surprising from a principal agent
perspective. As noted in the previous sections, the Commission has been granted
much room to manoeuvre by its principal, the Council and increasingly the European
Parliament. There are no restricting administrative procedures when it comes to the
terms by which expertise should be used or to the composition of expert groups.
Hence, contrary to what might be expected when a self-interested actor has much
leeway, the Commission does not seem to misuse its position.
Having said this, it is import to put the results into the context of the overall
process of EU policy-making. We focus on the early stage of policy-making, when
topics might not yet be much politicised, in the sense that other political actors such
as the Council or the European Parliament are not yet paying much attention. It may
well be that at later stages the Commission will use the scientific input it has gained
through its expert committee in a more strategic way. When confronted with oppo-
sition from the Council and/or the European Parliament, the Commission may tailor
knowledge generated during the expert group meetings to substantiate its policy
preferences or to claim epistemic authority. Future research needs to clarify whether
this is the case, or whether the instrumental use of scientific knowledge remains
dominant at all stages of the policy process.
Three modes of knowledge utilisation
We began this section by discussing the results for each statement. This allows for
a rich and detailed analysis of our results. As the statements have been derived from
the conceptual literature on modes of knowledge utilisation, it is interesting to know
whether the statements actually capture the three dimensions of knowledge utilisation
developed in the literature.
To test the dimensionality of the empirical data and its structural composition, the
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) technique is applied (Tabachnick and Fidell,
2007). The PCA is a tool to identify the underlying patterns of knowledge utilisation
in the data and to classify them according to practices existing in empirical settings
(ibid, p. 607). As our conceptualisation has arrived at three modes of knowledge
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utilisation (instrumental, substantiating, legitimising), we set the fixed number of
factors and run statistical software (SPSS) to extract three factors.4 The three-factor
solution was preferred because of its theoretical support.
The initial results show that indeed three groups can be differentiated but that
two of the 12 statements load on the ‘wrong’ dimension. The four statements
measuring instrumental knowledge utilisation load as expected on the first com-
ponent, but the first statement measuring substantiating, and the first statement
measuring legitimising knowledge utilisation do as well. Three remaining state-
ments of substantiating knowledge utilisation (Q4, Q7, Q11) load on component 2.
Component 3 is loaded with the three remaining statements of legitimising knowl-
edge utilisation (Q5, Q9, Q12). By searching for explanations why two statements
did not confirm to our expectations, we conclude that the first three statements of
each mode (Q1 – instrumental, Q2 – substantiating, Q3 – legitimising) are formulated
in a rather general way. They all received a higher acceptance rate compared
with other statements within the group. The words used in these statements have
a broad meaning, that is they are not as specific and concrete as the other state-
ments in each group. For example, the phrases ‘legitimise the decisions’, ‘justify
predetermined policy choices’ and ‘broaden the understanding of existing issue’
are rather abstract statements and contain theoretical concepts, for example to
legitimise, which can be confusing to the respondents. It is this communality
between Q1–3 that leads to them loading on the same factor. We conclude that even
though these statements are theoretically relevant, the operationalisation is not
explicit enough.
In a second step, we dropped the first three statements of each mode. We ran
the PCA again with the remaining nine statements, which explain 66 per cent of the
variance. The initial eigenvalues show that the first factor explains 33.6 per cent of
the variance, the second factor 22.9 per cent and the third 9.3 per cent (see Table A1
in Appendix 1: Statistics). The results show that the theoretically defined con-
cepts can be reduced to three groups. The group labels (instrumental, substantiating
and legitimising) proposed in the literature on knowledge utilisation fit the extrac-
ted components. That is, three groups of statements loaded on the three different
components. Statistical results allow us to conclude that the threefold typology is
empirically valid and statements measuring each mode are reliable and have an
internal consistency. This is also supported by the Cronbach’s α score, that is equal
to or higher than 0.70 in each of three groups (see Table A2 in Appendix 1:
Statistics).
We should not, however, overlook that the eigenvalues show that the third
component has obtained less than 1.00 value (0.84) meaning that it is accounting
for less variance than had been contributed by one variable (Tabachnick and Fidell,
2007, pp. 644–646). Components with eigenvalues less than 1.00 are viewed as less
significant. Therefore, it is still necessary to test the instrument with new datasets to
arrive at more robust conclusions.
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Conclusion
This article contributes to the debate on the role of scientific expertise in European
Union policy-making, a query that is particularly relevant in the case of the Com-
mission’s exclusive responsibility and duty to initiate proposals and put them forward
onto the EU agenda. When it comes to the European Union, the existing literature is
strong on conceptualisation and there are studies that focus on institutional elements,
such as the composition of expert groups. Also a few case studies trace the use of
scientific knowledge regarding particular issues in particular settings. We contribute to
this literature with a large-N study in which we surveyed more than a 100 scientists
who had participated in the Commission expert groups about how their knowledge was
used by the Commission. The survey suggests that the instrumental use of knowledge
is dominant. Scientific expertise is used to broaden the understanding of existing issues
and to solve policy problems. Scientific expertise does translate into Commission’s
proposals. At the same time, many scientists agreed that there are also other modes of
using scientific knowledge. The knowledge is also used to substantiate decisions
already taken or to demonstrate competence vis-à-vis other actors. Yet, when asked
questions relating to the relative importance of the instrumental use of knowledge and
more strategic uses, most respondents felt that the instrumental use was dominant. In
the majority of investigated cases, non-scientific uses play a role as well but not as
important as scientific ones.
This result is good news for a functional theory of delegation. The Commission
predominantly acts in the way it is intended to act when it comes to scientific input. It
uses expertise to create sound policies. The dominance of the instrumental use of
knowledge is surprising from a principal agent perspective. Given the fact that the
Commission has much leeway in the use of scientific knowledge, one might have
expected more deviation and a more strategic use of knowledge.
One needs to keep in mind that the research is restricted to the perspective of the
scientists and that it focuses on the early stage of the EU policy process. It may well
be that the Commission uses knowledge more strategically when the pressure rises in
the negotiations with the Council and the European Parliament. Future research will
need to show whether the dominance of the instrumental use of knowledge is specific
to the first stage of policy-making or holds more generally.
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Notes
1 European Commission, ‘Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities’. Source:
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/. Note that the Commission’s expert group register
does not provide contact information. However, full name, surname, field, academic status and so on
are indicated in most cases, and further contact information was provided by the scientists on the
internet.
2 The data provided by the Commission regarding the academic status of the members of Commission
committees are not consistent. In some cases, the academic degree or title (PhD, Dr, Prof) was provided,
in other cases it was indicated that experts are ‘scientists’ without further specification.
3 The seven-point scale: 1 meaning that you strongly agree, 2 – moderately agree, 3 – slightly agree, 4 –
neutral/neither agree nor disagree, 5 – slightly disagree, 6 – moderately disagree, 7 – strongly disagree.
For the presentation purposes the seven-point scale is collapsed into ‘agree’, ‘neither agree/nor disagree’,
or ‘disagree’. By recoding the seven-point scale into the three-point scale, the general trends of the
responses become clearer.
4 The protocol adopted here for factor analysis is to use the setting PCA and rotate the matrix of loadings
to obtain orthogonal (independent) factors (Varimax rotation) of the 12 seven-point scale statements.
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Appendix
Table A1: Factor loadings and communalities based on a Principal Component Analysis with varimax
rotationa for nine statements measuring three modes of knowledge utilisation (120)
Component 1 2 3
Q6 Instrumental 0.83 0.12 −0.14
Q8 Instrumental 0.80 −0.16 −0.01
Q10 Instrumental 0.80 −0.06 0.17
Q4 Substantiating 0.02 0.77 0.16
Q7 Substantiating −0.02 0.77 0.05
Q11 Substantiating −0.07 0.65 0.24
Q5 Legitimising −0.10 0.57 0.57
Q9 Legitimising 0.22 0.12 0.86
Q12 Legitimising −0.29 0.45 0.64
Eigenvalues 3.02 2.06 0.84
Percentage of total variance 33.55 22.87 9.31
Number of test measures 3 3 3
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
aRotation converged in five iterations.
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the three modes of knowledge utilisation
No of items M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis Cronbach’s α
Instrumental 3 2.40 (1.22) 1.50 1.82 0.75
Substantiating 3 4.37 (1.70) −0.11 −0.85 0.70
Legitimising 3 4.56 (1.68) −0.27 −0.54 0.72
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